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MOTHERS AND SIGNIFICANT OTHERS:
PARENTAL STANDING TO SEEK VISITATION
RIGHTS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
CHILD
Although not expressly provided for in the Constitution, the
fundamental right to raise one's own children has been recog-
nized through its penumbras.' Traditionally, parenthood has been
an exclusive status under which the law has only recognized one
set of parents.2 As such, courts have closely scrutinized any at-
' See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (freedom of per-
sonal choice in family life protected by Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). Justice White, writing for the majority, ex-
plained: "The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential' "
(citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (right of parent to raise children is
fundamental one and beyond reach of any court)) "and 'basic rights of man' " (citing Skin-
ner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (right to procreate protected by Equal Protec-
tion Clause of Fourteenth Amendment)). Id.; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495-
96 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Four-
teenth Amendment states, in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id. Acknowledging that the Ninth Amend-
ment expressly recognizes a fundamental privacy right protected from abridgment by the
government though not mentioned in the Constitution, Justice Goldberg stated: "The en-
tire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly underlie its specific guarantees
demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family are of similar
order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected." Id. at 495; see also
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion). "[Tlhe Con-
stitution protects the family precisely because the institution of family is deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition." Id.; Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan declared that the "integrity of [family] life is some-
thing so fundamental that it has been found to draw to its protection the principles of
more than one explicitly granted Constitutional right." Id.; Sorentino v. Family & Chil-
dren's Soc. of Elizabeth, 378 A.2d 18, 20 (N.J. 1977) (constitutional right of natural par-
ents to custody may be primary but is not absolute), affd, 391 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1978). See
generally U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The Ninth Amendment states: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people." Id. But cf Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 536-40 (1977)
(Stewart, J,, dissenting). A biological relationship alone is not sufficient to create a "family"
to be afforded due process protection. Id. at 549 (White, J., dissenting). See generally JOHN
E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.28 (4th ed. 1991) (discussing
marriage and family rights as part of right to privacy).
2 See UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 1, 9B U.L.A. 296 (1979). Section one defines the relation-
ship between parent and child as "[t]he legal relationship existing between a child and his
natural or adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges,
duties, and obligations. It includes the mother and child relationship and the father and
child relationship." Id. See generally Katharine T. Bhrtlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Ex-
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tempt to terminate3 or interfere with a fit parent's right to cus-
tody and control of a child." Historically, visitation, as the alter-
ego of custody,5 has flowed from parenthood.6 The primary pur-
elusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed,
70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984). "A fundamental premise of the law of exclusive parenthood is
that parents raise their own children in nuclear families." Id. at 880-81. Thus, the law
generally recognizes only one mother and father for each child at one time. Id.
' See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.426 (West 1986) (termination statute requires parental
unfitness in deciding best interest); see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-69 (1982)
(due process requires clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness before state may
sever natural parent's rights); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657-58 (due process requires fitness
hearing before state may take children from unwed father in dependency proceeding fol-
lowing death of children's natural mother); see also Warren v. Warren, 386 So. 2d 1166,
1168 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980) (children removed from mother who had psychiatric history
despite their young ages); In re Massey, 341 N.E.2d 405, 407 (III. App. Ct. 1976) (best
interests of child can be considered only if court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that parent is unfit or consents to severance); Burch v. Burch, 398 So. 2d 84, 87 (La. Ct.
App. 1981) (unfitness displaces tender years doctrine); Mazurek v. Mazurek, 575 S.W.2d
227, 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (neglect and violent episodes warranted taking young child
from mother); cf Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). The majority of Justices agreed that a natural parent must be afforded adequate pro-
cedure before their parenthood may be taken away. Id.
' See, e.g., Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979). Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Burger revealed: "The statist notion that governmental power should supersede
parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repug-
nant to American tradition." Id. It is widely held that a state's power to impose reasonable
regulations for the control and duration of basic education does not displace the funda-
mental rights and traditional interests of parents in religious upbringing. Id. at 603-04; see
also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 205 (1972) (limited exception granted to
mandatory school attendance law for religious reasons). Society places a high value on pa-
rental direction in religious and educational upbringing of children in their early formative
years. Id. at 213-14: Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (state could not
prohibit private schools but could set educational and safety standards); Bennett v. Jeffreys,
40 N.Y.2d 543, 546, 356 N.E.2d 277, 280, 40 N.Y.S.2d 821, 825 (1976) (new hearing
ordered to determine child's best interests when unwed natural mother's prolonged and
voluntary separation from child constituted extraordinary circumstances); cf UNIF. MAR-
RIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 401(d)(2), 9A U.L.A. 207 (1987) (non-parent may not institute
custody action if child is in physical custody of parent). But see, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (state has wide range of power to limit parental authority). The
rights of parenthood are not beyond regulation. Id.
' See Jackson v. Fitzgerald, 185 A.2d 724, 726 (D.C. 1962) (awarding visitation to grand-
mother would impinge on father's vested right of custody). The court stated, "[t]he right
of visitation derives from the right of custody." Id.; Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 70 N.Y.2d
141, 142, 511 N.E.2d 75, 76, 517 N.Y.S.2d 932, 933 (1987) (former boyfriend could not
petition for visitation rights against wishes of custodial parent). The court found that
"[v]isitation is a sub-species of custody . I..." d. at 144, 511 N.E. 2d at 77, 517 N.Y.S.2d
at 933: Pennsylvania ex rel. Williams v. Miller, 385 A.2d 992, 994 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)
(maternal grandmother awarded visitation rights upon showing of best interests of child).
The court reasoned that "visitation is correlative to custody." Id.
' See Deville v. LaGrange, 388 So. 2d 696, 698 (La. 1980) (right of custody flows from
fact of parenthood); see also Maxwell v. LeBlanc, 434 So. 2d 375, 376 (La. 1983) "The
right of visitation for a non-custodial parent is a natural right with respect to his children
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pose of visitation was to protect the rights of the noncustodial par-
ent7 and to benefit the development of the child.' In determining
custody and visitation rights between parents, the dominant con-
cern has been the best interest of the child."
.... Id. Custody is a right of parenthood, and since visitation is a form of custody, the
rights to visitation belong to all parents. Id. at 377.
7 In re Marriage of Delf, 528 P.2d 96, 99 (Or. Ct. App. 1974). One basic policy to be
achieved in granting visitation privileges to a parent who does not have custody is to pro-
tect the right of a parent to know and share the love of the child. Id.; see Conkel v. Conkel,
509 N.E.2d 983, 985 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987). Failure of the custodial parent to accord visita-
tion rights to the non-custodial parent is an infringement on that parents right to visitation
as well as the child's right to live with that parent. Id.; Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 879, 883
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (visitation rights of non-custodial parent must be carefully guarded).
See generally Michael J. Lewinski, Note, Visitation Beyond the Traditional Limitations, 60 IND.
L.J. 191, 194-95 (1984-85). A parent's right of custody of a child becomes theoretically
impossible if a divorce has caused both parents to reside apart. Id. Thus, the law has as-
sumed a right of visitation in the non-custodial parent. Id. Visitation may be granted for a
specific period of time, or it may be granted liberally with the time frame to be determined
by the parents. Id. Visitation privileges may be granted without supervision, but in some
cases the presence of the custodial parent or some other guardian is required during the
period of the visit. Id.
8 See Conkel, 509 N.E.2d at 985. A child's need for visitation with a non-custodial parent
is a "natural right of the child and is as worthy of protection as is the parent's rights of
visitation with the child .... ." Id. Interference with a non-custodial parent's visitation
rights is an "infringement of the child's right to receive the love, affection, training and
companionship of the parent." Id.; Marriage of Delf, 528 P.2d at 99. The court noted that
one basic policy "to be achieved in granting visitation privileges to a parent who does not
have custody is to protect the right of the of the child to the emotional, social and learning
benefits of as stable a relationship as is possible with both parents." Id.; Patrick v. Patrick,
117 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Wis. 1962). The minor children of divorced parents "are entitled to
the love and companionship of both parents ...." Id. (quoting Block v. Block, 112 N.W.2d
923 (Wis. 1961)).
' See Kohl v. Murphy, 767 F. Supp. 895, 903 n.8 (N.D. I1. 1991) (paramount considera-
tion in all child custody proceedings is best interest of child); McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693
F. Supp. 318, 324 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (laws of most states mandate custody determinations be
made in best interest of child); Maxwell, 434 So. 2d at 378. The Louisiana Supreme Court
declared that when deciding what is in the best interest of the child and whether a parent
should be awarded visitation rights, a court should take into account: (1) the "love, affec-
tion and other emotional ties" between the child and the parties involved; (2) the ability of
the "parties involved to give the child love, affection, guidance, and continuation of the
educating and raising of the child;" (3) the ability of the "parties involved to provide the
child with material needs;" (4) "the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfac-
tory environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity" by keeping the child in
this environment; (5) "the relationship of the child's mother and father;" (6) "the moral
fitness of the parties involved;" (7) "the reasonable preference of the child;" (8) "the will-
ingness and ability of the parents to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-
child relationship;" and (9) the effect of visitation upon [the] physical condition of [the]
child." Id. at 377-78 (citations omitted). "The rights of any parent are always subservient
to the best interests of the child." Id. at 377. A parent seeking to deny visitation has the
burden of proving that "visitation would not be in the best interests of the child." Id. at
378: see also In re Marriage of Frey & Frey, 692 P.2d 615, 616 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (pre-
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The deterioration of the traditional two-parent nuclear family"0
has encouraged significant relationships between children and
adults who are not their biological or legal parents." These "sig-
nificant others" have increasingly obtained standing to seek visita-
tion rights. 2
sumption that child of tender years is better 6ff with its natural mother may be overcome
by best interest of the child). Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.240 (1990) (court may
order visitation to any person if in best interest of child) with LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 146.1
(West 1988) (any relative by blood or affinity not granted custody of child may be granted
reasonable visitation rights if in best interest of child).
1" See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1990 45 (110th
ed. 1990). Assuming continuation of past trends (Series A classification), household projec-
tions reveal that by the year 2000, approximately one in four (17.8 million) families (as
opposed to "nonfamily households") will be headed by a single parent rather than a mar-
ried couple, up from 13 percent (5.4 million) in 1970 and 19 percent (6.7 million) in 1980.
Id.: Only One U.S. Family in Four is 'Traditional', N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 30, 1991, at A19. Accord-
ing to a survey of 57,400 housing units conducted in March, 1990, economic factors and
the aging of the baby boomers may be contributing to the slowdown in the increase of new
households from the "breakneck pace" of the 70's. Id. The number of single parents (9.7
million) increased 41 percent from 1980, half the 82 percent increase from 1970. Id.; Bart-
lett, supra note 2, at 880-81 (citing increasing number of parents who never marry, parents
who divorce and stay single or remarry, parents who abandon their children and parents
who are adjudged unfit).
" See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, Note, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian Mother and Other Non-Traditional Families,
78 GEO L.J. 459 (1990) (advocating extension of parental rights to non-traditional
parents).
See Wis. STAT. ANN § 767.245 (1991) (court may grant visitation to any person who
has maintained parent-child relationship); In re Guardianship of Martha M., 251 Cal. Rptr.
567, 570 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (court upheld jurisdiction to award visitation rights, after
mother's suicide, to close friend of child's mother who had supported and developed loving
relationship with child); Wishart v. Bates, 531 So. 2d 955, 956 (Fla. 1988) (grandparent
entitled to visitation with child in custody of fit parent if in best interests of child), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989); Wills v. Wills, 399 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (former wife of adoptive father entitled to visitation privileges); Collins v. Gilbreath,
403 N.E.2d 921, 923 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (stepfather awarded visitation rights after
mother's death to smooth transition to custody of natural father); Evans v. Evans, 488 A.2d
157, 161-62 (Md. Ct. App. 1985) (former wife statutorily entitled to visitation with non-
adoptive minor stepson); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 622 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)
(paternal grandparents awarded visitation rights after parents divorced); L., K., C., B. & H.
K. v. G. & H., 497 A.2d 215, 222 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985) (emancipated siblings
granted visitation rights in best interest of child); State ex rel. A.H. v. Mr. & Mrs. H., 716
P.2d 284, 284 (Utah 1986) ("prospective adoptive parents had standing to petition for
restoration of custody"); Gotz v. Gotz, 80 N.W.2d 359, 360 (Wis. 1957) (court upheld visi-
tation rights of maternal aunts and their husbands after custody awarded to father when
mother was too ill to exercise her custodial rights); see, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 71
(McKinney 1989). The section states, in pertinent part:
[A] brother or sister... whether by.half or whole blood, may apply to the supreme
court by commencing a special proceeding or for a writ of habeas corpus to have
such child brought before such court . . . and . . . the court . . . may make such
directions as the best interest of the child may require, for visitation rights for such
420
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This Note will explore the meaning of parenthood for the pur-
pose of obtaining visitation rights in the nontraditional family set-
ting. Part One will examine various definitions of the term "par-
ent" and contemplate two alternative theories of parenthood. Part
Two will distinguish visitation rights from custody rights in light
of today's alternative family arrangements. Part Three will ad-
dress the need for equitable intervention to promote the best in-
terest of the child in the context of visitation. Finally, this Note
will advocate expansion of the orthodox definition of "parent" for
visitation purposes to better fulfill the changing needs of society.
I. ACQUISITION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. The Current Status of Parenthood
Parenthood has attained an exclusive status under which the
law generally recognized only one set of parents.13 The term par-
ent has historically referred to the lawful mother or father of a
person.14 Biological affiliation has always been a key factor in ac-
quisition of parental rights,15 although it is not necessary that the
brother or sister in respect to such child.
Id. See generally Miriam B. Chaloff, Note, Grandparent's Statutory Visitation Rights and the
Rights of Adoptive Parents, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 149, 149 (1982) (many states by statute allow
grandparents to seek visitation with their grandchildren). But see Huffman v. Grob, 218
Cal. Rptr. 659, 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (court denied visitation petition to child's aunt
and uncle after mother's death led to child's adoption by stranger); Temple v. Meyer, 544
A.2d 629, 632-33 (Conn. 1988) (trial court did not err in refusing to grant visitation rights
to mother's boyfriend); cf Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 70 N.Y.2d 141, 142, 511 N.E.2d 75,
77, 517 N.Y.S.2d 932, 932 (1987) (former boyfriend, non-biological father, could not peti-
tion for custody absent legislative grant of standing).
" See supra note 2 (sources cited therein).
" See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). Parent is defined as "[t]he
lawful mother or father of a person." Id.; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-expressing
Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 337 (1988). Changing society's view about the status of
parenthood is a "long term project." Id. "Current legal thinking ... causes us to focus on
• . . the achievements, biological contribution and 'rights' " of the parent, thereby giving
us an "individualistic, possessory" image of parenthood. Id. But see Solberg v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 185 N.W.2d 319, 322-23 (Wis. 1971). The word parent not only refers to the
persons responsible for the child's conception and birth, but also to those who share "mu-
tual love and affection with a child and who supply the child support and maintenance,
instruction, discipline and guidance." Id.
6 See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). The "biological connection . . .
offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relation-
ship with his offspring" and an interest entitled to constitutional protection. Id.; In re Ra-
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mother and father be married to each other.16
The biological mother or father must be a fit parent in order to
secure and sustain legal protection of their rights. 17 Adoption has
always been the standard exception whereby a nonbiological par-
ent has been legally protected. 8 Nevertheless, legal recognition
quel Marie X., 76 N.Y.2d 387, 402, 559 N.E.2d 418, 424, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855, 861 (1990)
(unwed biological father's right to custody of adopted* newborn constitutionally protected
"so long as he promptly avails himself of all the possible mechanisms for forming a legal
and emotional bond with his child"), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 517 (1990); Bennett v. Jeffreys,
40 N.Y.2d 543, 546, 356 N.E.2d 277, 281, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824 (1976) ("The parent
has a 'right' to rear its child [absent] exceptions created by extraordinary circumstances
such as surrender, abandonment, persistent neglect .... ").
"0 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972). Marriage of the biological parents
is not a prerequisite to legal rights. Id.; see also Traci Dallas, Note, Rebutting the Marital
Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test, 88 COL'UM L. REV. 369, 373-74 (1988) (two-thirds
of states have statutes that explicitly or through judicial interpretation allow putative fa-
ther's right of action to rebut marital presumption by clear and convincing evidence in
some states and by overwhelming evidence in others); see also, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-
25-126(l)(e)(iv), 19-6-105(1)(f) (1986) (putative father can rebut marital presumption of le-
gitimacy of child born in wedlock, if blood tests show 97% chance or better that either
parent to marriage not actual parent of child). See generally Mary Kay Kisthardt, Of Father-
hood, Families and Fantasy: The Legacy of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 TUL. L. REV. 585, 585-
86 (1991) (rebutting marital presumption and providing alternative analysis of Michael H.);
William Weston, Putative Fathers' Rights to Custody-A Rocky Road at Best, 10 WHITTIER L.
REV. 683 (1989) (discussing establishment of custodial and visitation rights of out of wed-
lock fathers). But see UNIF PARENTAGE ACT §§ 4(a), 6(a), 9B U.L.A. 302 (1987) (incorpo-
rated by five states, UPA permits rebuttal of presumption of paternity by clear and con-
vincing evidence); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-30 (1989) (probable
biological father denied parental rights in favor of presumption of husband's paternity);
Vincent B. v. Joan R., 179 Cal. Rptr. 9, 10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (state has legitimate inter-
est in preserving integrity of family unit).
" See Ashford v. Hassan, 88 A.D.2d 977, 977-78, 452 N.Y.S.2d 322, 323 (2nd Dep't.
1982) (biological father denied custody pending determination of fitness); see also supra
note 3 (fitness is prerequisite to maintenance of parental rights). But cf In re S.L.H., 342
N.W.2d 672, 677 (S.D. 1983). "It is hazardous . . . to assume that removing child from an
imperfect home invariably will benefit the child." Id. (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 765 (1982)).
1" See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 393 (1979) (suggesting that where unwed
father has "substantial relationship" with child, his consent to adoption is necessary); In re
Upjohn's Will, 304 N.Y. 366, 373, 107 N.E.2d 492, 494 (1952). Adoption recognizes "the
fundamental social concept that the relationship of parent and child, with all the personal
and property rights incident to it may be established, independently of blood ties, by opera-
tion of law ..... Id.; Matter of Evan, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 3, 1992, at 25, col. 6 (granting adop-
tion petition to mother's homosexual partner in best interest of child); see also, e.g., N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1984). In affording equivalent parental rights, the adop-
tion statute states in pertinent part: "Adoption is the legal proceeding whereby a person
takes another person into the relation of child and thereby acquires the rights and incurs
the responsibilities of parent in respect of such other person." Id.; cf Judy E. Nathan,
Note, Visitation After Adoption: In the Best Interests of the Child, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 633, 633-
34 (1984) (courts attempt to preserve child's existing emotional relationships by granting
custody to their "psychological parents"). "Psychological parent" has been defined as the
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and enforceability of such rights have been co-extensive with
some showing of assumption of parental responsibility for and es-
tablishment of a relationship with the child.'9 It is submitted that
the best interest of the child, rather than biological affiliation,
should be the most determinative factor in establishing parental
rights.
B. Alternative Theories for Establishing Parenthood
With the decline of the traditional nuclear family, both custody
and visitation rights have been extended beyond the mother and
father of the child in order to meet changing familial and societal
needs.2 0 This is most common where one of the child's primary
caretakers is someone other than the biological or adoptive
parent.2"
person who meets the child's emotional and physical needs. Id.; J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUND &
A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, 17-19 (1979). But cf In re Rhine,
456 A,2d 608, 614 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (clear and convincing evidence that visitation
would severely endanger child is required before natural parents' visitation of child in fos-
ter care can be terminated).
'9 See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (unwed biological father denied
right to object to adoption by stepfather for failure to shoulder responsibility or petition
for legitimation); see also Bannister v. Bannister, 81 A.D.2d 913, 914, 439 N.Y.S.2d 194,
196 (2d Dep't 1981) (remanded for determination of child's best interest after finding that
protracted acquiescence of physical custody of child with mother's sister showed lack of
interest sufficient to constitute extraordinary circumstances); In re Board, 150 Misc.2d 743,
744, 570 N.Y.S.2d. 269, 271 (Family Ct. New York County 1991) (biological father es-
topped to assert paternity of emancipated child after failure to establish any personal or
legal bond); cf Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 661 n.1 (1972) (unwed father did not ask
for legal responsibility but only objected to someone else having legal control over his chil-
dren) (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 38, 39-40) (Burger, C.J., dissenting))). But see Lehr v. Robert-
son, 463 U.S. 248, 257 (1983) (New York statute requiring unwed father to openly live
with child or mother for six continuous months in order to veto adoption was unconstitu-
tional, neither legitimately furthering state's interest nor sufficiently protecting father's).
" See generally Lewinski, supra note 7, at 193 (advocating extension of visitation rights to
third parties in loco parentis). The increased divorce rate and entrance of women into the
work force has caused greater reliance on third parties who "often contribute significantly,
sometimes more so than the mother or father, to the child's development." Id.; Mary Patri-
cia Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of "Family", 26 GONZ. L. REV. 91, 96-99
(1991) (comparing legal premises and factual realities underlying modern family structure);
supra note 10 (statistics reflecting societal changes in traditional families).
"' See supra note 12 (non-parents receiving visitation rights).
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1. Equitable Parenthood
The doctrine of equitable parenthood22 which was set forth in
Atkinson v. Atkinson,23 has been employed as an alternative method
of determining custody and visitation rights of nonbiological and
nonadoptive parents. The Michigan court in Atkinson applied the
doctrine of equitable estoppel24 to award parental rights and privi-
leges to a stepfather who acted as the child's father, against the
wishes of the putative biological father.25 The court reasoned that
the applicable statute, known as the Child Custody Act, 26 was eq-
uitable in nature and thus should be liberally construed to ad-
vance the best interest of the child.2 7
The equitable estoppel principle as applied to parenthood has
similarly prevailed in other jurisdictions as the courts wrestle with
complex issues of support and visitation. 28 The doctrine has been
2 Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). The doctrine of
equitable parenthood states:
[A] husband who is not the biological father of a child born or conceived during the
marriage may be considered the natural father of that child where (1) the husband
and the child mutually acknowledged a relationship as father and child, or the
mother of the child has cooperated in the development of such a relationship over a
period of time prior to the filing of the complaint for divorce, (2) the husband
desires to have the rights afforded to a parent, and (3) the husband is willing to take
on the responsibility of paying child support.
Id. But see In re Marriage of Goetz & Lewis, 250 Cal. Rptr. 30, 33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(court refused to expand equitable parent doctrine to award custody rights to stepfather
absent legislation).
23 Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d at 516.
24 Id. at 519-20. The doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes a person from asserting a
right that he might otherwise have. Id.; In re Board, 150 Misc. 2d 743, 744, 570 N.Y.S.2d
269, 270 (Family Ct. New York County 1991) (equitable estoppel may prevent exercise of
right to prevent inequity); see also American Bank & Trust Co. v. Trinity Universal Ins.
Co., 205 So. 2d 35, 40 (La. 1967) (equitable estoppel is effect of voluntary conduct which
prevents party from asserting an existing right against another). Id. For equitable estoppel
to apply, this other person must have justifiably relied on the conduct and it must be appar-
ent that he or she will suffer injury if the first party is allowed to enforce his or her right.
Id.
25 Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d at 519-20; see also In re Guardianship of Ethan S., 271 Cal.
Rptr. 121, 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (equitable estoppel invoked against putative father by
non-parent).
" MICH. STAT. ANN. §25.244(3) (1984).
27 Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d at 519-20.
28 Cf Hartman v. Smith, 674 P.2d 176, 178-79 (Wash. 1984) (equitable estoppel barred
custodial parent's past-due child support claim against biological father who consented to
adoption by stepfather which was subsequently vacated). But see Albert v. Albert, 415 So.
2d 818, 820 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (former husband not equitably estopped from deny-
ing paternity merely because he signed birth certificate where no showing of reliance on
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employed in New York to preclude a husband from denying sup-
port to children conceived by his wife through artificial insemina-
tion,29 and in New Jersey to prohibit a husband from denying sup-
port to a child conceived by his wife during an extra-marital
affair.30 Similarly, a Pennsylvania court precluded a biological fa-
ther from adopting his own son, since the natural mother was es-
topped from severing her former husband's relationship with her
child."
It is submitted that the equitable parenthood principle should
be extended beyond husbands and stepfathers to grant standing to
seek visitation to other equitable parents, particularly when the
noncustodial, natural parent has relinquished his rights or has
made no objection.
2. In Loco Parentis
A second viable alternative for the establishment of parental
status is the doctrine of in loco parentis, which means literally "in
the place of a parent."3" A person standing in loco parentis to a
child has assumed the status and daily obligations of a parent with-
out formal, legal approval. 3
misrepresentation by spouse or child). See infra notes 30-31. (sources cited therein).
"' Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 1089, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 412 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1963); see also Wener v. Wener, 35 A.D.2d 50, 53, 312 N.Y.S.2d 815, 818 (2d
Dep't 1970) (husband had duty to support child he neither fathered nor adopted on "dual
foundation of an implied contract to support child and equitable estoppel" since wife
would not have acquired child alone). But see K. B. v. N. B., 811 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Ct. App.
1991) (husband not estopped where statute required written consent to artificial insemina-
tion and none was given).
so M.H.B. v. H.T.B., 498 A.2d 775, 775 (N.J. 1985)
In re Adoption of Young, 364 A.2d 1307, 1311 (Pa. 1976); see also Johnson v. John-
son, 286 N.W.2d 886, 887 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (mother estopped from denying paternity
of husband when child born in wedlock); In re Paternity of D.L.H., 419 N.W.2d 283, 287
(Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (mother estopped from claiming that husband was not biological fa-
ther and thus was not entitled to parental rights); cf Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110, 124-30 (1989) (since mother's husband presumed to be father, probable biological
father denied parental rights).
" See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 787 (6th ed. 1990). In loco parentis is defined as "[iln the
place of a parent; instead of a parent; charged, factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties
and responsibilities.' Id.
11 See Griego v. Hogan, 377 P.2d 953, 955 (N.M. 1963). (in loco parentis exists when
person undertakes care and control of another in absence of such supervision by natural
parent and in absence of formal legal approval). It is temporary in character and is not to
be likened to adoption which is permanent. Id.; see also Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d
1083, 1089, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 412 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1963) (husband liable for sup-
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In 1989, the Oregon legislature expressly conferred upon the
courts the power to grant custody, guardianship, visitation and
other generally recognized rights to persons who established emo-
tional ties creating a child-parent relationship so long as it was in
the best interest of the child. 4
Although the in loco parentis doctrine has been applied to award
visitation to stepparents, 35 some jurisdictions have blatantly disre-
garded the best interest of the child by denying standing to other
third parties.3  Notably, courts in Wisconsin, 37 New York, 3 and
California 39 have recently declined to grant custody or visitation
port of child conceived by artificial insemination); Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 66
(Utah 1978) (former husband in loco parentis entitled to reasonable visitation with stepson);
Sparks v. Hinckley, 5 P.2d 570, 571-72 (Utah 1931) (rights and obligations of one in loco
parentis exactly same as parent); In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765, 775 (Wash. 1942) (in loco
parentis parties have constitutional right to custody and control of minor children); cf
Rutkowski v. Wasko, 286 A.D.2d 327, 330, 143 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (3d Dep't 1955) (stepson
precluded from suing in loco parentis stepfather for negligence).
" OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119 (1989). The statute defines the parent-child relationship as:
A relationship that exists or did exist, in whole or in part, within the six months
preceding the filing of an action under this section, and in which relationship a per-
son having physical custody of a child or residing in the same household as the child
supplied, or otherwise made available to the child, food, clothing, shelter and inci-
dental necessaries and provided the child with necessary care, education and disci-
pline, and which relationship continued on a day-to-day basis, through interaction,
companionship, interplay and mutuality, that fulfilled the child's psychological needs
for a parent as well as the child's physical needs.
Id. The statute utilized a time threshold by providing that the relationship must have ex-
isted for at least six months prior to commencement of a proceeding to obtain such rights.
Id.
" See Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850, 854 (Alaska 1982) (stepparent who assumed in
loco parentis status possessed parental status to seek visitation with stepchild). But cf Rourke
v. State of Ariz., 821 P.2d 273, 277 (Ariz. 1991) (foster parents do not have in loco parentis
status); Franklin v. Franklin, 253 P.2d 337, 340 (Ariz. 1953) (in loco parentis status termi-
nated by divorce).
"' See generally Lewinski, supra note 7, at 194-95 (advocating extension of parental rights
in best interest of child). A friend, neighbor, aunt, or lesbian lover of a biological mother
may establish an in loco parentis relationship with a child just as a stepparent may. Id. To
deny individuals visitation rights with children they have loved, cared for, and established a
relationship with would generally discourage involvement with children as well as nega-
tively affect the welfare of the child. Id. A person who has developed an in loco parentis
relationship with a child should have visitation privileges regardless of his or her general
relation to the child. id.
37 See, e.g., Sporleder v. Hermes, 471 N.W.2d 202, 203 (Wis. 1991) (single woman de-
nied custody and visitation of adopted son of former partner of eight years); see also infra
notes 76-79 and accompanying text (underlying action affecting family unit is necessary
before court may apply best interest test).
" Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E.2d 27, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1991).
" Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 217 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). "The concept
of 'in loco parentis' . . . has never been applied in a custody dispute to give a non-parent
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rights to other third parties. In Sporleder v. Hermes,40 the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court denied custody and visitation rights to a single
woman who had lived with the child and his adoptive father for
eight years.4' The New York Court of Appeals, in Alison D. v. Vir-
ginia M., 42 denied parental standing to the former lesbian partner
of the child's mother, who arguably stood in loco parentis" and
sought visitation rights under section 70 of New York's Domestic
Relations Law."" The court reached this result notwithstanding
the parties' mutual decision to have the mother artificially insemi-
nated and to raise the child together."' In vigorous dissent, Judge
Kaye believed the decision would unreasonably preclude all but
the biological parents from petitioning for visitation by "fixing bi-
ology as the key to visitation rights."" A California appellate
court similarly declined to award custody to the mother's former
lesbian partner in Nancy S. v. Michele G., 47 specifically refusing to
the same rights as a parent, and we are unpersuaded that the concept should be so ex-
tended." Id.
"0 Sporleder, 471 N.W. 2d at 207-09.
"' Id. The court stated its adherence to a "parental preference" standard which favored
natural, biological parents and precluded non-parents from obtaining custody. Id. at 207.
Furthermore, the court denied visitation rights on the ground that since there was no un-
derlying divorce action affecting the family unit visitation by the non-parent was unneces-
sary for minor's well-being. Id. at 209.
42 77 N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E. 2d 27, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1991).
" Id. at 655-56, 572 N.E.2d at 28-29, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 587-88.
41 See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1988). The relevant portion of the statute
states:
Where a minor child is residing within this state, either parent may apply to the
supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus to have such minor child brought before
such court; and on the return thereof, the court, on due consideration, may award
the natural guardianship, charge and custody of such child to either parent for such
time, under such regulations and restrictions, and with such provisions and direc-
tions, as the case may require, and may at any time thereafter vacate or modify such
order. In all cases there shall be no prima facie right to the custody of the child in
either parent, but the court shall determine solely what is for the best interest of the
child, and what will best promote its welfare and happiness, and make award
accordingly.
Id.
4 Alison D. 77 N.Y.2d at 655-56, 572 N.E.2d at 28-29, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 587-88. The
court found that since the natural mother was a fit parent and no extraordinary circum-
stances were present the court, should not interfere with the mother's right to decide to
terminate the relationship with her former lover. Id. at 656-57, 572 N.E.2d at 29, 569
N.Y.S.2d at 588 (citing Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 544, 356 N.E.2d 277, 280, 387
N.Y.S.2d 821, 823 (1976)).
4" Id. at 657, 572 N.E.2d at 30, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 589 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
" 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 217 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
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extend parental rights to the nonparent, even if she had stood in
loco parentis to the child.4 8
Admittedly, in loco parentis status or de facto parenthood, with-
out formal assumption of legal obligations, neither displaces nor
supersedes parental rights.49 It is submitted, however, that ex-
tending visitation to "significant others," who realistically have
taken the place of a second parent, would not supersede an absent
parent's rights, nor would it severely impair the rights of the cus-
todial parent any more than visitation by a stepparent could. Fur-
ther, it is submitted that the refusal to recognize in loco parentis
status beyond stepparents stems from outdated precedent and re-
luctance to promote the best interest of the child by providing a
"second parent."
In Gribble v. Gribble,5" the Supreme Court of Utah recognized in
loco parentis status based on the intentions of both the natural par-
ent and the third party involved.51 A "significant other" who has
maintained a relationship which was initiated and condoned by
the parent, has established a "psychological parenthood."5 It is
submitted that a "significant other," who may be indistinguishable
to a young child from a real parent, should be granted standing to
seek visitation, since the parent should be estopped from disavow-
ing a relationship he both encouraged and relied upon when it
was convenient to do so.
48 Id.
41 See Teitler v. Haironson, 38 A.D.2d 949, 331 N.Y.S.2d 461 (2d Dep't 1972), affd, 31
N.Y.2d 712, 289 N.E.2d 557, 337 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1972) (in loco parentis status does not
afford superior rights over third persons and court considers best interest of child). But see
Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 879, 881-82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (in loco parentis stepparent's
rights jealously guarded by courts).
50 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978).
"' Id. at 66-67. Whether or not one assumes in loco parentis status "depends on whether
that person intends to assume that obligation." Id. at 66.
82 See Bartlett, supra note 2, at 944-51. Bartlett's proposal for an alternative to exclusive
parenthood takes into account the child's need for continuation of a child's relationship
with a non-parent. Id. at 944. The author states that a psychological parent should have
custody rights if the legal parent is absent. Id. at 946. The requirements for psychological
parenthood are that (1) the adult have had physical custody of the minor for at least six
months, (2) the adult must demonstrate that his motive in seeking parental status is the
genuine care and concern for the child, and (3) the adult must prove that the parent-child
relationship began with the consent of the child's legal parent(s) or the court. Id. at 946-48.
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II. VISITATION
A. Distinction Between Custody and Visitation
Custody generally refers to the care, control and maintenance
of a person,"3 and parents have enjoyed a natural and legal right
to the custody of their children.5 Custody disputes concern a par-
ent's right to raise a child,55 and courts generally do not disturb
the biological or adoptive parent's custody of the child absent
some clear indication of gross misconduct, unfitness, or some
other extraordinary circumstance negatively affecting the welfare
of the child.5"
6' See, e.g., Trompeter v. Trompeter, 545 P.2d 297, 301 (Kan. 1976). Custody also in-
cludes the right to the child's service and earnings and the right to make decisions about
his or her care, control, education, health and religion. Id.; see also In re Marriage of Gins-
berg, 425 N.E.2d 656, 657 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (discussing various forms of custody);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 384 (6th ed. 1990). Custody encompasses the right of a parent
with respect to rearing and caring for a child. Id. Basically, two forms of custody have been
acknowledged by our legal system. Id. Divided custody means that each parent gets com-
plete control and custody over the child for part of the year, and the other gets visitation
rights during that period. Id. Joint custody of children means the physical sharing of a
child by both parents who jointly make decisions affecting the child's life. Id.; cf Doucet v.
Doucet, 465 So. 2d 175, 177 (La. Ct. App. 1985) joint custody does not mean "a fifty-
fifty" sharing of time).
" Leroy v. Odgers, 503 P.2d 975, 977 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972). "[T]he right of parents to
the custody of minor children is both a natural and a legal right." Id.; see also Acomb v.
Billeiter, 175 So. 2d 25, 28 (La. Ct. App. 1965). As between parents and non-parents, only
the parents have a legal and natural right to the custody of their children, and absent
parental unfitness, the parents' rights must prevail. Id.; In re Devone, 356 S.E.2d 389, 391
(N.C. Ct. App. 1987). "The natural and legal right of parents to the custody, companion-
ship, . . . and control of their children is not an absolute right and it may be limited or
denied in the best interest of the child." Id. See generally Peggy Blotner, Comment, Third
Party Custody and Visitation: How Many Ways Should We Slice the Pie? DET. C.L. REV. 163
(1989). A majority of states today presume that it is in the best interest of the child to be
raised by his or her biological parent. Id. However, this is a rebuttable presumption. Id.
The burden of proof is on the non-parent to show unfitness and this burden is rarely over-
come. Id.
11 See In re Adoption of Mays, 507 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986). "[I]n a cus-
tody dispute between a parent and a non-parent, the fundamental right of a parent to raise
his own child is brought into play." Id.; see also Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 546,
356 N.E.2d 277, 281, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824 (1976). Custody cases challenge the right of a
parent to raise a child, and the right of a child to be raised by his/her parents. Id.
" See Anderson v. Woods, 179 S.E.2d 569, 572 (W. Va. 1971) "Although a parent has a
natural right to the custody of his or her infant child such custody will be denied where the
parent is unfit because of misconduct, neglect, immorality, or where the custody has been
relinquished or surrendered." Id.; see also In re Steckman, 620 P.2d 319, 321 (Kan. 1980).
"Custody or severance of parental rights is dependent upon fitness." Id.; see also Bennett, 40
N.Y.2d at 546, 356 N.E. 2d at 281, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 824. The Bennett court stated:
Examples of cause or necessity permitting displacement of or intrusion on parental
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Traditionally, visitation has referred to the noncustodial par-
ent's right of access to his or her child. 7 As between two parents,
visitation has been awarded to protect the rights of the noncus-
todial parent as well as to promote the welfare of the child. 8 Visi-
tation has proven to be meaningful to the child's mental, physical
and spiritual growth.59 Studies have shown that discontinuing a
parent-child relationship may have a destructive effect on the
control would be fault or omission by the parent seriously affecting the welfare of a
child, the preservation of the child's freedom from serious physical harm, illness or
death, or the child's right to an education, and the like.
Id. See generally supra notes 3, 4, & 16 (discussing effect of unfitness and misconduct on
right of parental custody).
" See In re Tate, 797 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). The generally accepted
meaning of the term visitation implies a brief period of custody of a minor or child by a
visiting relative. Id.; Patrick v. Patrick, 117 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Wis. 1962). "In the most-
restricted sense, a parent's right to visit his child while in the custody of another, means a
right of access to the child." Id.; see also Shee v. Holewski, 463 A.2d 480, 483 n.2 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1983). In Shee, when faced with the undefined term "visitation," as used in the
state's Custody and Grandparents Visitation Act, the Superior Court assumed that the leg-
islature intended the common meaning of the term. Id. Thus, the court assumed visitation
to mean the privilege to see a child wherever he or she may be located, but not the right to
take possession of the child. Id.
The law allows a parent to assume that he or she has a basic right to visitation if he or
she does not possess custody of his or her child. See Lewinski, supra note 7, at 194-95. The
author noted that a parent has the right of custody of a child, but this becomes theoreti-
cally impossible if a divorce has caused both parents to reside apart. Id. Thus, the law has
assumed a right of visitation in the non-custodial parent. Id. Visitation may be granted in a
number of different ways. Id. It may be granted for a specific period of time, or it may be
granted liberally with the time frame to be determined by the parents. Id. Visitation privi-
leges may be granted without supervision, but in some cases the presence of the custodial
parent or some other guardian is required during the period of the visit. Id.
0s See In re Marriage of Delf, 528 P.2d 96, 99 (Or. Ct. App. 1974). In Marriage of Delf,
the court noted that:
There are two basic policies to be achieved in granting visitation privileges to a par-
ent who does not have custody: The right of the child to the emotional, social and
learning benefits of as stable a relationship as is possible with both of the parents and
the right of a parent to know and share the love of the child.
Id.: see also supra notes 7 & 8 (discussing dual purpose of visitation).
11 See Maxwell v. LeBlanc, 434 So. 2d 375, 379 (La. 1983). "The child's experience of
family continuity and connection is a basic and fundamental ingredient of his sense of self,
of his sense of personal significance and his sense of identity." Id.; Pierce v. Yerkovich, 80
Misc. 2d 613, 621, 363 N.Y.S.2d 403, 410 (Family Ct. Ulster'County 1974) (visitation im-
portant for whole growth of child); see also T.S. Elliot, Note, Medical Technology and the
Law, II. Reproductive Technologies, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1535 n.56 (1990). "Sociologists
have found that the primary factors contributing to a child's healthy development are the
quality and continuity of parental relationships that a child forms, rather than the influ-
ences of traditional lifestyles or of a parent of either gender."Id. (citing MICHAEL RUTTER,




A decision to grant visitation has merely implicated the custo-
dial parent's right to choose with whom the child associates.6"
Customarily, visitation has been awarded when it has been in the
best interest of the child to maintain a particular relationship with
the noncustodial party.6"
Although visitation has been called a form of custody, 3 the two
terms are legally distinguishable.64 Regrettably, some courts have
obscured this distinction by applying the same criteria to visitation
issues as they have for custody determinations.6 5 Recently, in Ali-
son D. v. Virginia M.,16 the New York Court of Appeals based its
decision to deny visitation on the premise that custody and visita-
tion disputes are similar and therefore should be treated alike.67
However, such reasoning fails to recognize that a grant of visita-
tion rights has a relatively minuscule effect on a parent's custody
80 See Elliot, supra note 59, at 1535. Severing an important relationship with a child by
denial of visitation may leave the child feeling confused and rejected. Id.; see also Maxwell,
434 So. 2d at 379. The Maxwell court stated:
While a child is cut off from one of his parents . . . there is, for the child and the
parent . . . a mutual sense of deep personal loss. Denying a child the ability to visit
with and know the non-custodial parent does deep and profound violence to the
child's opportunity to know himself in a whole way.
Id.
81 See Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 70 N.Y.2d 141, 144, 511 N.E.2d 75, 77, 517 N.Y.S.2d
932, 934 (1987). The state may not interfere with the fundamental right of the custodial
parent to choose whom their child associates with. Id. But see Yerkovich, 80 Misc. 2d at 625,
363 N.Y.S.2d at 413 (custodial parent does not have exclusive right to determine, in best
interest of child, that non-custodial parent should not be permitted to associate with child).
82 See, e.g., Looper v. McManus, 581 P.2d 487, 489 (Okla. Ct. App. 1978) (court awarded
visitation rights to stepmother, stating that relationship would contribute in positive way to
child's mental health and well being); see also Leininger v. Leininger, 355 N.E.2d 508, 515
(Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (friend of child's natural father was awarded visitation rights after
establishing five year relationship that was beneficial to maintain).
8 See supra note 5 (discussing visitation as a form of custody).
84 See Westrate v. Westrate, 369 N.W.2d 165, 168 (Wis. 1985). "Custody and visitation
are distinct legal terms with different meanings." Id.; J.M.S. v. H.A., 242 S.E.2d 696, 697
(W. Va. 1978). "Custody" relates to care and keeping while "visitation" indicates an act or
instance of visiting, and one with custody has more authority and power than one with
visitation privileges. Id.
8" See infra notes 69-78 and accompanying text (courts that have used an inappropriate
test in determining custody or visitation disputes).
88 77 N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E.2d 27, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1991).
67 Id. at 654-55, 572 N.E.2d at 28, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 587. The court held that one peti-
tioner was not a parent within the meaning of New York Domestic Relations Law § 70 and
therefore, could not apply for a writ of habeas corpus to determine the issue of visitation
rights. Id.
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and control as contrasted with an actual award of custody. 68
In Gorman v. Gorman,"' a Florida appellate court awarded cus-
tody to a stepparent over the child's natural father.7 0 Although
the Gorman court specifically acknowledged that the biological
parents' right to custody and control of their children should not
be taken lightly, it denied custody to the biological parent of the
child.7" The court stated that when the rights of the parent con-
flict with the best interest of the child, the best interest standard
should be utilized.7 2 Thus, the court used the standard visitation
test to determine a custody dispute.7 3
In Sporleder v. Hermes7 4 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin de-
nied custody and visitation to the female companion of an adop-
tive mother." In denying custody, the court reasoned that since
the legal parent was neither unfit nor unable to care for the child,
custody should not be disturbed.7 6 However, in determining
whether visitation privileges should be granted, the court declined
to apply the best interest standard, concluding that there must be
an "underlying action affecting the family unit" before visitation
can be awarded. 77
By adjudicating a claim for visitation using the same standards
employed in custody claims, some courts have ignored the pur-
pose of visitation and have precluded any consideration of the
best interest of the child. 78 It has been suggested that the custody-
determination standard should not be employed. 9 It is submitted
" See LeBouef v. LeBouef, 325 So. 2d 290, 292 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (visitation privileges
do not substantially affect custodial parent's right to custody and control); Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 50 Misc. 2d 43, 46, 269 N.Y.S.2d 500, 504.(Family Ct. Queens County 1966)
(granting visitation right to grandparent would not diminish parent's custody or control
rights).
" 400 So. 2d 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
70 Id. at 77.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 77-78.
71 Id. at 77 (court applied best interest test to determine custody even though parent was
fit).
7' 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991).
75 Id. at 204.
76 Id.
17 Id. at 209-10.
" See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d at 658-59, 572 N.E.2d at 30-31, 569 N.Y.S.2d
at 589-90 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
71 See generally Eric P. Salthe, Note, Would Abolishing the Natural Parent Preference in Cus-
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that until a determination is made as to what standard should be
employed, standing should be granted to "significant others" to
seek visitation and the best interest of the child standard should
be maintained.
B. Contemporary Family Relationships
In the past, children were generally raised by their natural
mothers and fathers in what has come to be known as a "tradi-
tional" or "nuclear" family.80 However, in contemporary society,
the decline in the marriage rate and the increase in the number of
unmarried couples has caused this family structure to crumble. 81
As a result, today, an ever increasing number of children are
raised in "alternative family" settings.8" Such alternative families
include heterosexual or homosexual couples, stepparent families,
and single parents.8"
The demise of the traditional family unit has caused concern
for the welfare of innocent children, who have formed strong
emotional and physical bonds with, and have come to depend on,
outsiders such as babysitters, day-care workers, teachers, relatives,
friends, and others who have often spent more time with the chil-
dren than their own parents.8 Increasing numbers of nonparents
have sought to maintain these relationships by acquiring visitation
rights.85 Most states have extended visitation to grandparents,86
tody Disputes be in Everyone's Best Interest?, 29 J. FAM. L. 539, 539-50 (1990-91) (advocating
universal use of best interest test in custody determinations).
80 See Rebecca L. Melton, Note, Legal Rights of Unmarried Heterosexual and Homosexual
Couples and Evolving Definitions of Family, 29 J. FAM. L. 497, 497-500 (1990-91) (decline of
traditional nuclear family has led to alternate family arrangements).
81 Id.; see also supra note 10 (sources cited therein).
82 Id.
83 Id.
" See generally Lewinski, supra note 7, at 192-93. Given the increased number of single
parent households combined with the increased proportion of women in the work force, a
child is more likely to develop strong emotional bonds with substitute caretakers than ever
before. Id. at 193.
86 See Bartlett, supra note 2, at 880-81. The commentator states that:
fAin increasing number of children do not live in traditional nuclear families. In
1982, twenty-five percent of children under the age of eighteen in the United States
- over fifteen and a half million children - did not live with both natural parents
. . . .The reasons for this phenomenon are familiar. More and more parents obtain
divorces, resulting in single parent families or, as divorced parents remarry, step-
families. An increasing number of parents never marry. Some parents abandon their
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and other states have granted such rights to blood relatives,87
stepparents," and various other interested third parties.8"
Although nonparents are increasingly becoming involved in
child rearing, such alternative family arrangements still retain the
valuable qualities of the traditional family, including love, support,
children; others give their children to temporary caretakers; and still others are
judged unfit to raise their children, who are then placed in foster homes.
Id.
8, See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 1988) (grandparents granted standing to
obtain visitation where either or both parents deceased or where equity would see fit to
intervene). Section 72 states, in pertinent part:
[A] grandparent or . . . grandparents . . . may apply to the supreme court by com-
mencing a special proceeding or for a writ of habeas corpus to have such child
brought before such court.., and.., the court ... may make such directions as the
best interest of the child may require, for visitation rights for such grandparent or
grandparents in respect to such child.
Id.; Cockrell v. Sittason, 500 So. 2d 1119, 1121 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (trial court's award
of visitation privileges to maternal grandparents after death of child's mother upheld);
Brown v. Meekins, 666 S.W.2d 710, 710 (Ark. 1984) (maternal grandparents given visita-
tion rights by court after child was adopted subsequent to his mother's death); Hamilton v.
Hamilton, 622 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (court awarded paternal grandparents
visitation rights after child's parents divorced).
Prior to enactment of section 72, grandparents had no standing to sue for visitation un-
less the question of custody was already before the court. See, e.g., Geri v. Fanto, 79 Misc.
2d 947, 949, 361 N.Y.S.2d 984, 986 (Family Ct. Kings County 1974). See generally Miriam
B. Chaloff, Note, Grandparent's Statutory Visitation Rights and the Rights of Adoptive Parents,
49 BROOK L. REV. 149, 149 (1989) (many states allow grandparents to seek visitation with
their grandchildren). But see LoPresti v. LoPresti, 40 N.Y.2d 522, 526, 355 N.E.2d 372,
375, 387 N.Y.S.2d 412, 415 (1976) (grandparent statute does not grant automatic or abso-
lute right to visitation when parents are deceased).
87 See L. v. G., 497 A.2d 215, 223 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985) (court granted visita-
tion right to adult, emancipated siblings); Gotz v. Gotz, 80 N.W.2d 359, 362 (Wis. 1957)
(court upheld visitation rights of maternal aunts and their prospective husbands after cus-
tody was awarded to father when mother was too ill to exercise custodial right); see also
supra note 12 (text of N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 71 regarding sibling visitation). But see
Huffman v. Grob, 218 Cal. Rptr. 659, 664 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (court denied petition for
child visitation by aunt and uncle of child after mother's death and child's adoption by
stranger).
88 See Collins v. Gilbreath, 403 N.E.2d 921, 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (stepfather
awarded visitation rights after death of mother to smooth transition to custody of natural
father); Evans v. Evans, 488 A.2d 157, 166 (Md. 1985) (granted former wife visitation with
stepson after divorce). But see Shoemaker v.. Shoemaker, 563 So. 2d 1032, 1034 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1990) (stepparent has no right to visitation with stepchild, since legal relationship
severed by divorce). See generally supra notes 28-31, 35 (visitation awarded to stepparents
standing in loco parentis).
8 See In re Guardianship of Martha M., 914, 251 Cal. Rptr. 567, 570 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988) (court had authority to award visitation rights after mother's death to close friend of
child's mother who had supported and developed loving relationship with child); Wills v.
Wills, 399 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1981) (woman who was married to adop-
tive father of child received visitation privileges). But see Temple v. Meyer, 544 A.2d 629,
632 (Conn. 1988) (refused to grant visitation rights to boyfriend of child's mother).
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loyalty and affection.9" It is suggested that decisions by courts to
extinguish all ties between a child and a "significant other" par-
ent"' deprive a child of those qualities that are essential for the
child's growth and development, and therefore do not serve the
best interest of the child.
III. EQUITABLE INTERVENTION IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
CHILD
A. Visitation in the Best Interest of the Child
The ultimate goal of the court in a visitation dispute is to
render a decision in the best interest of the child.92 There is a
long-standing presumption that granting visitation rights to a nat-
ural parent is in the best interest of the child. 93 Nevertheless,
other parties are not precluded from seeking and obtaining visita-
tion rights. 94 These other parties, however, first must gain stand-
ing and then must demonstrate that "extraordinary circum-
stances"95 exist before the state will interfere with parental
, See Melton, supra note 80, at 497-500 (decline of traditional nuclear family has led to
alternate family arrangements).
91 See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 655-56, 572 N.E.2d 27, 28-29, 569
N.Y.S.2d 586, 587-88 (1991) (former live-in lesbian lover of mother denied visitation);
Sporleder v. Hermes, 471 N.W.2d 202, 204 (Wis. 1991) (female "companion" of adoptive
mother denied visitation with child).
92 See, e.g., Matter of Marriage of Kiister, 777 P.2d 272, 275-76 (Kan. 1989). "In deter-
mining child custody matters and visitation rights, the court's paramount concern is the
welfare of the child." Id.; see also supra note 9 (discussing courts' concern with best interest
of child in visitation disputes).
" See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Burger explained:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a
child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making
life's-difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.
Id. (citing, I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 447; 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERI-
CAN LAW 190). But see, e.g., Mark V. v. Gale P., 143 Misc. 2d 487, 540 N.Y.S.2d 966, 968
(Family Ct. Schenectady County 1989) (father's wishes overridden by extraordinary cir-
cumstances whereby court awarded subordinate custody to deceased wife's former live-in
lover); cf., Pierce v. Yerkovich, 80 Misc. 2d 613, 614, 363 N.Y.S.2d 403, 404 (Family Ct.
Ulster County 1974) (consent to visit should not be left to sole discretion of custodial
parent).
"' See supra note 12 (discussing non-parents who have requested and been awarded visi-
tation privileges).
" Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 545, 356 N.E.2d 277, 280, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824
(1976). Chief Judge Breitel, writing for the majority stated:
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custody.9 6 It is submitted that when the issue in dispute is solely
one of visitation, a showing of extraordinary circumstances should
not be necessary before a court can consider what is in the best
interest of the child.
In Maxwell v. LeBlanc9 7 the Louisiana Supreme Court indicated
factors that the court should take into account when deciding
what is in the best interest of the child and whether a parent
should be awarded visitation rights. 8 The court's list included the
love, affection and other emotional ties between the child and the
parties involved, the ability of the parties to give the child love,
affection, guidance, and a continuing education, the ability of the
parties involved to provide for the child's necessary material
needs, and the relationship between the child's parents.99 The
Maxwell court also added that the court should take into account
the moral fitness of the parties involved, the willingness and abil-
ity of the parents to assist and encourage a close and continuing
parent-child relationship, and the effect of visitation on the physi-
cal well-being of the child."' 0
In determining the best interest of the child, the child's prefer-
ence should be considered by the court if the child has reached a
certain level of maturity.01 Moreover, the parent's biased view-
The day is long past in this State, if it had ever been, when the right of a parent to
the custody of his or her child, where the extraordinary circumstances are present,
would be enforced inexorably, contrary to the best interest of the child, on the sole
theory of an absolute legal right. Instead, in the extraordinary circumstance, when
there is a conflict, the best interest of the child has always been regarded as superior
to the right of parental custody.
Id. at 546, 356 N.E.2d at 280, 387 N.Y.S.2d 824-25 (emphasis added).
Chief Judge Breitel concluded that "[a]lthough the extraordinary circumstances trigger
the 'best interests of the child' test, this [does] not mean that parental rights or responsibili-
ties may be relegated to a parity with all the other surrounding circumstances .... " Id. at
548, 356 N.E.2d at 282, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 826; see Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972) (courts and law are powerless to supplant parents except for grievous cause or
necessity).
9" See Roland F. v. Brezenoff, 108 Misc. 2d 133, 436 N.Y.S.2d 934, 935 (Family Ct. N.Y.
County 1981) (former boyfriend and neighbor lacked standing to petition custody or visita-
tion or guardianship). See generally ELLIOT L. BISKIND BOARDMAN'S N.Y. FAMILY LAW § 45(1)
n.27 (1987) (standing must be gained before best interests are determined).
*' 434 So. 2d 375 (La. 1983).
I d. at 378.
9 Id.
100 Id. at 378-79.
101 See Simmons v. Simmons, 554 So. 2d 238, 243 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (court able to
consider child's custodial preference if child is of sufficient age); see also Schouten v. Schou-
436
Vol. 7: 417, 1991
Parental Standing
point should not supersede the best interest of the child.'0 2 In the
wake of a parental divorce or separation, it is essential to maintain
as stable an environment as possible for the child which would in-
clude the continuation of existing relationships.'
B. Legislative Intent and the Court's Proper Role
In order to determine the best interest of the child, courts have
enforced the parens patriae power of the state.10 4 As "parent of
the country,"'0 5 the state may equitably intervene in child custody
cases in order to balance competing. interests and thereby protect
those persons under legal disability. 06 This equitable power is
well established,0 7 but it has called into question whether the
ten, 155 A.D.2d 461, 463, 547 N.Y.S.2d 126, 128 (2d Dep't 1989). The child's preference
is an indication of what is in the child's best interest, but it is not conclusive. Id. To deter-
mine the proper weight given to such preference, the court should consider the child's age
and maturity, and the possibility that the preference may have been influenced by an inter-
ested party. Id.
'0o See Collins v. Gilbreath, 403 N.E.2d 921, 923 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). The court should
not deny visitation privileges in all cases merely because a parent claims that such privileges
will harm the child. Id. This is especially true where a third party has acted as the child's
parent, because in such disputes the well being of the child must be paramount. Id.; see also
Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 879, 882 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) The personal preferences or
prejudices of the parent should not control the decision in a visitation case. Id.
103 See Rogers v. Rogers, 577 So. 2d 761, 763 (La. Ct. App. 1991) The stability of the
environment should be a concern in determining the best interest of a child. Id. Such an
environment should not be disturbed absent compelling circumstances. Id.; Linam v. King,
804 P.2d 1235, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (to determine best interest of the child court
should consider need for stability in child's environment); see also Caso v. Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Servs. 569 So. 2d 466 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (stable environ-
ment needed to achieve child's emotional security).
104 See Thompson v. Gorman, 502 N.E.2d 916, 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). Parens patriae
power is limited to three factors: (1) dependent children; (2) where clear and convincing
evidence of parental unfitness has been shown; and (3) to further best interest of the child.
Id.; Hunter v. Duncan, 288 P.2d 388, 391 (Okla. 1955) (parens patriae concerned with
"welfare of the child"). But cf Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1115-16 (Okla. 1985) (parens
patriae doctrine traditionally invoked only where necessary for protection of child). It is
unnecessary for the state to act as surrogate parent "where the child's own custodial par-
ent's interest is not at issue with the interest of the child." Id.
105 West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 871 (1971). Parens patriae literally means 'parent of the country.' Id.; accord In re
Richard P., 451 A.2d 274, 278 (R.I. 1982) (parens patriae concept gives state responsibility
to act as "'superparent"); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, 1114 (6th ed. 1990). (" 'Parens patriae,'
literally 'parent of the country'....").
' Pfizer, 440 F.2d at 1089; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). (" 'Parens
patriae,' . . . refers traditionally to role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under
legal disability, such as juveniles or the insane.").
107 See Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 434, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925) (court of equity
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state is competent to "raise children".108 In recognizing that the
best interest of the child is paramount, the New York Court of
Appeals, in Bennett v. Jeffreys,' °9 adopted the "modern principle
that a child is a person and not a subperson over whom the parent
has an absolute possessory interest."' 10 It is submitted that, in visi-
tation disputes, until the state legislatures conform to society's
changing needs, it is proper for the courts to equitably intervene
under the state's parens patriae power to safeguard the best inter-
est of the child.
When confronted with a habeas corpus petition for visitation in
Alison D. v. Virginia M., ' the New York Court of Appeals de-
clined to countermand the natural mother's wishes to sever the
child's relationship with her lesbian partner," 2 and the court re-
fused to grant standing to seek visitation without a showing of bio-
logical or legal ties.1 3 The court reasoned that the applicable stat-
ute, New York Domestic Relations Law section 70," only
may act at instance of anyone where habeas corpus petition is denied); see also Bachman v.
Mejias, I N.Y.2d 575, 136 N.E.2d 866, 154 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1956); cf People ex rel. Kropp
v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 468, 113 N.E.2d 801, 803 (1953) (parens patriae power to deter-
mine best interest must be qualified in contest between parent and non-parent; since parent
is superior in right to all others unless parent abandons that right or is proven unfit); Peo-
ple ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 542, 104 N.E.2d 895, 896 (1952) (discretion
of Supreme Court is not absolute or uncontrolled).
108 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (plurality opinion) (raising child is
beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions). See generally Bartlett, supra
note 2, at 881. In giving decisional rights to parents, the state recognizes that it cannot
effectively raise children. Id.
10 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976) (new hearing ordered to
determine child's best interest when unwed natural mother's prolonged and voluntary sep-
aration from child constituted extraordinary circumstances).
10 Id. at 546, 356 N.E.2d at 280, 40 N.Y.S.2d at 825. Although a child's rights are
superior, the Bennett court found that it is in the child's best interest to be raised by its
parent, unless that parent is disqualified by gross misconduct. Id. at 547, 356 N.E.2d at
282, 40 N.Y.S.2d at 825 (citing Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv. v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196,
204, 274 N.E.2d 431, 436, 324 N.Y.S.2d 937, 944 (1971)); accord Kridel v. Kridel, 205
A.2d 316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964).
1' 74 N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E.2d 27, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1991).
112 Id. at 654-55, 572 N.E.2d at 28, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
113 Id. at 656, 572 N.E.2d at 29, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
"1 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1988). The text of this section was amended in
1988 to incorporate a new subsection (b) pertaining to visitation rights of those children in
custody by virtue of Family Court Act and Social Services Law. Id. Subsection (a) remains
unchanged since 1964 when the legislature deleted the words, "A husband or wife, being
an inhabitant of this state, living in a state of separation, without being divorced, who has a
minor child .... " and added, in place thereof, "Where a minor child is residing within this
state, either parent .... " 1964 SESSION LAWS OF NEW YORK, sec. 1, ch. 564, p. 858.
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provided that "either parent" could petition for visitation with a
child. '5 As Judge Kaye pointed out in dissent, the term "parent"
remained undefined in the statute. 16 When a court is not bound
by a statutory definition, it should look beyond the plain meaning
of the word and construe the term to effectuate the statutory
objectives. 1 7 In section 70, the stated legislative purpose is the
best interest of the child."' The Alison court's refusal to grant
I Id.
11 Alison D. v. Virginia M., 74 N.Y.2d 651, 658, 572 N.E.2d 27, 30, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586,
589 (1991) (Kaye, J., dissenting). Judge Kaye argued that since the Legislature chose not to
define the term "parent" in the Domestic Relations Law, the court was not bound to a
specific statutory definition. Id. at 659, 572 N.E.2d at 31, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 590; see also In
re Roman, 94 Misc. 2d 796, 405 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Family Ct. Onondaga County 1978); cf
N.Y. Enuc LAW § 3212 (McKinney 1974). For purposes of this statute, a "person in paren-
tal relation" includes the birth or adoptive father and mother, step-father, step-mother,
legally appointed guardian or custodian. Id. A "custodian" is defined as one who "has as-
sumed the charge and care of such individual because the parents . . . have died, are im-
prisoned, are mentally ill . . . have been committed to an institution . . . have . . . aban-
doned or deserted .... or are living outside the state or their whereabouts are unknown."
Id: N.Y. FAM CT. ACT § 1012(a), (g) (McKinney 1984). Section 1012(a) defines a respon-
dent in child protective proceeding as any parent or other "person legally responsible for a
child's care." Id. Section 1012(g) defines a person legally responsible for child's care to
include a "custodian (which) may include any person continually or at regular intervals
found in the same household as the child when the conduct of such person causes or con-
tributes to the abuse or neglect of the child." Id.
As noted in the commentary to section 1012, "The primary effect of this supplemental
definition of the word 'custodian' is to authorize child protective petitions against par-
amours." N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012 commentary at 235 (McKinney 1988).
"I See Cahen v. Boyland, I N.Y.2d 8, 14, 132 N.E.2d 890, 892, 150 N.Y.S.2d 5, 9
(1956) (effect must be given to all language employed); Palmer v. Van Santvoord, 153 N.Y.
612, 616, 47 N.E. 915, 916 (1897) (courts are bound to assume that words in statute are
inserted for purpose); see also McKINNEY'S STATUTES §73. "While the courts may sometimes
depart from the literal wording of an enactment when such departure is necessary to fur-
ther the legislative intent, when the intent of the lawmakers is not in doubt, the courts
cannot revise the legislation or do otherwise than to carry out its plain command." Id.;
Meltzer v. Koenigsberg, 302 N.Y. 523, 525, 99 N.E.2d 679, 680 (1951) (resort is to be had
first to words and language and "when the words have a definite and precise meaning," it
is not allowable "to go elsewhere in search of conjecture in order to restrict or extend the
meaning"); Bacon v. Miller, 247 N.Y. 311, 317-18, 160 N.E. 381, 383-84 (1928) (court's
duty is to construe statutes and not to legislate). But see Spillane v. Katz, 25 N.Y.2d 34, 37,
250 N.E.2d 44, 46, 302 N.Y.S.2d 546, 548 (1969) ("[T]he court may not substitute itself
for the Legislature merely because the Legislature has failed to act").
11 See NY- DOM REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1988). The relevant portion of the statute
states: "In all cases there shall be no prima facie right to the custody of the child in either
parent, but the court shall determine solely what is for the best interest of the child, and
what will best promote its welfare and happiness, and make award accordingly." Id.; Alison
D., 74 N.Y.2d at 660, 572 N.E.2d at 31, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 590 (Kaye, J., dissenting). It is
accurately noted that the legislature has expressed a clear mandate to consider the best
interest of the child in awarding custody and visitation. Id. (quoting Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40
N.Y.2d at 543, 356 N.E.2d at 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 821); see also supra note 45 (discussing
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visitation to the nonbiological parent was labeled a "retreat from
the court's proper role" by dissenting Judge Kaye, n9 who primar-
ily relied on the recent decision in Braschi v. Stahl Associates.'2
In Braschi, the New York Court of Appeals expanded the previ-
ously undefined term "family" to grant standing to a homosexual
lover so that he could remain in his deceased lover's rent-con-
trolled apartment. 2 Although the decision was expressly limited
to the facts of the case,1 22 it is submitted that the holding in Bras-
chi clearly illustrates the court's power to construe an undefined
statutory term and accordingly, the court should allow an ex-
panded definition of the word "parent" in visitation proceedings.
In New York, standing as a parent has been a prerequisite to peti-
tioning for visitation. 23 However, it is vital not to lose sight of the
court's legitimate role in the procedural quagmire of our legal
124system.
relevant text of section 70).
19 Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 657-58, 572 N.E.2d at 30, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 589 (Kaye, J.,
dissenting). While conceding that "there must be some limitation on who can petition for
visitation," the dissent urged fashioning a judicial definition of the word "parent," which
would encompass relevant factors such as prior consent to the relationship by the biological
or legal parent and prior joint custody for a significant period of time, as other states have
in defining visitation rights of stepparents. Id. at 662, 572 N.E.2d 27, 35, 569 N.Y.S.2d at
591 (citing Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1988)).
120 Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784
(1989): see Alison D., 74 N.Y.2d at 661, 572 N.E.2d at 32, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 591 (Kaye, J.,
dissenting). Judge Kaye noted that courts had previously defined terms in other statutes. Id.
(citing, e.g., People v. Eulo, 63 N.Y.2d 341, 354, 472 N.E.2d 286, 294, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436,
444 (1984) (defining "death" for purposes of homicide prosecutions)).
.21 Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 211-13, 543 N.E.2d at 54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
122 Id. at 216, 543 N.E.2d at 56-57, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
12I See, e.g., Roland F. v. Brezenoff, 108 Misc. 2d 133, 436 N.Y.S.2d 934 (Family Ct.
N.Y. County 1981) (former boyfriend could not petition for custody absent legislative
grant of standing); see also N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 70 commentary at 247 (McKinney 1988).
See generally BOARDMAN, N.Y. FAMILY LAW § 45(1) n.27, (1987) (standing must be gained
before best interests are determined.)
124 See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 659-60, 572 N.E.2d 27, 31, 569
N.Y.S.2d at 586, 590 (1991) (Kaye, J., dissenting). Judge Kaye asserted that the absence of
a statutory definition does not necessarily limit the court solely to a biological definition of
parent. Id. Rather, the court should have comported with the legislative expansion of cus-
tody and visitation to all children domiciled in the state, whereby the legislature brought
"section 70 into conformity with what the courts were already doing," (citing MEM. OF
JOINT LEGIS. COMM. ON MATRIMONIAL AND FAMILY LAWS, reprinted in 1964 SESSION LAWS OF
NEW YORK 1880); Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 434, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925) (court of
equity may act at instance of anyone where habeas corpus petition is denied); Lewinski,
supra note 7, at 194-95. Some courts have failed to use the best interest of the child stan-
dard in deciding the visitation rights of third parties. Id. These courts have claimed that
440
Vol. 7: 417, 1991
Parental Standing
CONCLUSION
As society evolves, so should the legal system that serves soci-
ety's needs. The failure of the courts to keep pace with changes in
the traditional family structure by limiting parental standing es-
tablishes dangerous precedent. In order to preserve important re-
lationships between children in nontraditional families and their
equitable parents, standing to seek visitation rights should be equi-
tably extended to these "significant others" to appropriately de-
termine the best interest of the child.
Susan Gross Goldstein & Christopher j. Soltys
they lacked the power to grant visitation in such a situation, or the third party did not have
standing to seek such visitation. Id. But see Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979)
(plurality opinion) (raising child is beyond competence of impersonal political institutions).

